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Abstract: Why is it that we respond emotionally to plays, movies, and novels and 
feel moved by characters and situations that we know do not exist? This question, 
which constitutes the kernel of the debate on »the paradox of fiction«, speaks 
to the perennial themes of philosophy, and remains of interest to this day. But 
does this question entail a paradox? A significant group of analytic philosophers 
have indeed thought so. Since the publication of Colin Radford’s celebrated paper 
»How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« (1975), the number of 
proposals to solve, explain, reformulate, dismiss or even revitalize this appar-
ent paradox has continued to proliferate. In line with recent developments in 
the philosophy of emotion, in this paper I will argue against the sustainability of 
the paradox, claiming that the only reasonable way to continue our discussions 
about it consists in using it as a heuristic tool to shed light on problems regarding 
our involvement with fiction. Against this background, I will then focus on one of 
the problems related to how our emotional responses to fiction contribute to our 
appreciation of it.
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section shows the par-
allel evolution of the paradox of fiction and the analytic philosophy of emotion. 
Here I claim that, although the paradox is epistemically flawed, since one of its 
premises is rooted in a limited view on the emotions typical of early cognitiv-
ism, the discussions it provokes are still epistemically useful. As Robert Stecker 
(2011, 295), among others, has pointed out, the paradox was formulated during 
the heyday of cognitive theories of the emotions in which emotion necessarily 
requires belief. Today, however, only few authors would endorse this premise. If 
emotion does not always require belief (as the majority of authors in the contem-
porary debate admit), let alone belief about the existence of the object towards 
which it is directed, then there is no reason to speak of a paradox. From this first 
conclusion, however, it does not follow that the paradox is completely without 
use from the epistemic point of view. A glimpse at the topics touched on during 
the discussions about how to solve, reformulate, or negate the paradox reveals 
their value in shedding light on the interrelation between emotion and fiction.
The second section elaborates a phenomenologically inspired cognitive 
account of the emotions by focusing on their cognitive bases, their influence on 
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cognitions, and their cognitive function. In this model, emotions are responsible 
for indicating values, for showing what matters to us, and for being appropriate 
to their objects. My claim is that this view applies not only to reality, but also to 
our involvement with fiction.
In the final section I draw on this account to focus on one kind of apprecia-
tion of fiction which necessarily requires our emotional involvement. Following 
an idea put forward by Susan Feagin (1996, 1), I employ the concept of »appre-
ciation« to refer to a set of abilities exercised with the aim of extracting value 
from the work. There is a long tradition in aesthetics that condemns any focus on 
the emotions in the appreciation of art and fiction, and defends the necessity of 
aesthetic appreciation without emotional influence. To refer to this negative atti-
tude towards the emotions, I will borrow an expression coined by Susan Feagin 
(2013, 636), who refers to »the intellectualized view of appreciation«. Against this 
widespread view, I will argue that some aspects of the fiction can only be appre-
ciated with the help of our emotions. The cognitive approach developed in the 
previous section can explain how the emotions might in fact play a significant 
role in the appreciation of art and fiction. Attention will be paid to three activities 
involved in appreciation, for all of which emotion is crucial: processing relevant 
information about the fictional world, understanding aspects of it, and becoming 
acquainted with the values it presents. My aim here is to argue that there are 
particular aspects of the fictional world that can only be appreciated if recipients 
have the appropriate emotions.
Keywords: paradox of fiction, cognitivism, affective intentionality, appreciation, 
value
1  Introduction
Why is it that we respond emotionally to plays, movies, and novels and feel 
moved by characters and situations that we know do not exist? This question, 
which constitutes the kernel of the debate on »the paradox of fiction«, speaks 
to the perennial themes of philosophy, and remains of interest to this day. But 
does this question entail a paradox? A significant group of analytic philosophers 
have indeed thought so. Since the publication of Colin Radford’s celebrated paper 
»How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?« (1975), the number of 
proposals to solve, explain, reformulate, dismiss or even revitalize this appar-
ent paradox has continued to proliferate. In line with recent developments in 
the philosophy of emotion, in this paper I will argue against the sustainability of 
the paradox, claiming that the only reasonable way to continue our discussions 
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about it consists in using it as a heuristic tool to shed light on problems regarding 
our involvement with fiction. Against this background, I will then focus on one of 
the problems related to how our emotional responses to fiction contribute to our 
appreciation of it.
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section shows the par-
allel evolution of the paradox of fiction and the analytic philosophy of emotion. 
Here I conclude that, although the paradox is epistemically flawed, since one 
of its premises is rooted in a limited view of the emotions typical of early cog-
nitivism, the discussions it provoked remain epistemically useful. The second 
section elaborates a cognitive account of the emotions by focusing on their cog-
nitive bases, their influence on cognitions, and their cognitive function. In the 
final section I draw on this account to focus on one kind of appreciation of fiction 
which necessarily requires our emotional involvement.
2  The Paradox of Fiction: An Epistemic Evaluation
The publication of Radford’s paper forty years ago determined the basis for what 
would go on to become one of the most prolific discussions within analytic aes-
thetics. The »paradox of emotional responses to fiction« or, in its short version, 
just the »paradox of fiction« (henceforth »the paradox«) attracted the attention 
of those philosophers working on emotion and fiction and it has generated a 
considerable volume of literature. According to the authors of this debate, the 
paradox entails three premises, all of which are taken to be plausible, but when 
put together constitute a contradiction: 1) we have emotional responses towards 
what we know to be fiction; 2) we do not believe that fictional characters exist; 
and 3) to experience an emotion requires that we believe that the object of our 
emotion exists. Despite its apparent plausibility, in this paper I find the paradox 
to be unsustainable. As Robert Stecker (2011, 295), among others, has pointed 
out, the paradox was formulated during the heyday of cognitive theories of the 
emotions in which emotion necessarily requires belief. Today, however, only few 
authors would endorse the third premise. If emotion does not always require 
belief (as the majority of authors in the contemporary debate admit), let alone 
belief about the existence of the object towards which it is directed, then there 
is no reason to speak of a paradox. Should we just dismiss it? To answer this 
question we need to focus first on how the paradox emerged alongside analytic 
theories of emotion, how it came to be that the majority of philosophers no longer 
regard our emotional reactions to fiction as problematic, and what the fruits of 
this debate have been.
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What is very symptomatic of the paradox (and should invite our suspicions 
about it) is that it was first formulated in the context of the early analytical the-
ories of the emotions. The emotions first drew the interest of analytic philoso-
phers during the 1960s, especially after the publication of Anthony Kenny’s book 
Action, Emotion and Will (1963). As is well known, these early theories endorsed a 
cognitive view of the emotions, according to which they are intimately related to 
beliefs. The idea that emotions require beliefs was a common thread of the major-
ity of theories of the emotions developed during early cognitivism. There are three 
popular versions of this view: a) emotion is a combination of beliefs and desires 
(cf. Marks 1982, 227–242); b) emotions are judgments (cf. Solomon 1993, 126); and 
c) emotions require belief as their cognitive basis (cf. Kenny 1963, 195; Taylor 1985, 
3). The main preoccupation of these theories was to explain the intentionality 
of the emotions, thus leaving aside other aspects, such as their qualitative and 
bodily dimensions. These theories were convinced that if emotions are about 
something, i.  e. if they are intentionally directed to the world, then this is because 
they inherit this intentional structure from the beliefs on which they are based. In 
this framework, it is not surprising that the emotional responses towards fiction 
appear to be problematic. The three premises of the paradox seem true (the third 
premise in particular was considered to be incontestable) and, thus, they are 
indeed in tension.
The solutions proposed during the first decades after the formulation of the 
paradox were consonant with those theories of the emotions associated with 
early cognitivism.1 All of them shared an acceptance of a paradigm of the emo-
tions in which belief is essential for rational and real emotion (as an ingredient 
or requirement). The two most popular solutions to the paradox are illustrative 
of this period. Whereas Radford (1975, 78), in the aforementioned paper, chal-
lenged doxastic and practical rationality, it was Kendall Walton (1993, 196; 271) 
who proposed that we consider our emotions towards fictional entities as qua-
si-emotions, i.  e. as phenomena that, despite resemblances to full-fledged emo-
tions, lack motivational power regarding deliberate actions, and are produced 
through a game of make-believe.
During the last few decades, however, and coinciding with a change of par-
adigm in the philosophy of emotion that criticizes the early cognitive view, some 
authors have questioned the tenability of the paradox. The idea that emotion 
requires or entails belief has been rejected in favor of a new form of cognitiv-
ism. This new cognitive approach maintains that the emotions have a sui generis 
1 Cf., for an overview of the solutions during early cognitivism, Levinson 1998, 20–36. For an 
overview that identifies two periods of the paradox cf. Vendrell Ferran 2014, 313–337.
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form of intentional reference which is neither reducible to belief nor inherited 
from beliefs. The representative approaches belonging to this paradigm of »affec-
tive intentionality« (a name that underscores the idea that there is an original 
emotive intentionality that can give us information about the world) understand 
the emotions as »embodied appraisals« (cf. Prinz 2004), »feeling towards« (cf. 
Goldie 2002) or »value perceptions« (cf. Tappolet 2000). In the next section, I 
will develop a cognitive account of the emotions that considers these propos-
als. For now, it is important to note that these accounts inaugurated a new way 
of thinking about the paradox. On the one hand, some authors proposed what 
have been called »anti-judgementalist solutions« to the paradox, according to 
which emotions do not always require beliefs about the existence and features of 
their objects (cf., for instance, Matravers 2006, 254). On the other hand, in a more 
radical vein, some authors adopted a dismissive attitude towards the paradox. 
This negationist approach denies that the paradox is in fact a paradox: they speak 
clearly of the »fiction of the paradox« (Moyal-Sharrock 2009, 169), and state that 
it makes no difference for our emotions »whether I am responding to the real, the 
merely imagined, the possible, or the impossible« (Robinson 2005, 145).
If, contrary to early cognitive views, these recent developments in emotion 
theory are correct in their claim that emotion does not always require or entail 
belief, the third premise of the paradox is false. Ergo, we can conclude that the 
paradox is epistemically faulty; that there is no paradox at all. The parallel evolu-
tion of the debate about the paradox and the philosophy of emotion in the ana-
lytic tradition indicates that this pseudo-problem was motivated by a view on 
the emotions that has since become obsolete.2 The paradox is therefore a typical 
problem of analytic aesthetics and the flawed approach to the emotions endorsed 
during its early years. It is revealing that only during early cognitivism has our 
engagement with fiction been regarded as paradoxical.
From this first conclusion, however, it does not follow that the paradox is 
completely without use from the epistemic point of view. A glimpse at the topics 
touched on during the discussions about how to solve, reformulate, or negate 
the paradox reveals their value in shedding light on the interrelation between 
emotion and fiction. I cannot agree more with Stecker (2011, 308) when he claims 
that the paradox has been an important heuristic tool for understanding not 
only our emotional engagement with fiction, but also the nature of emotion and 
imagination. Indeed, the paradox served as a touchstone for improving and refin-
ing our accounts about how we engage emotionally with fiction and participate 
imaginatively in it. Thus, it is not only that the developments in the philosophy of 
2 Cf., for a recent attempt to revitalize the paradox, Cova/Teroni 2016, 930–942.
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emotion have led to changes in the way we view the paradox, but also vice versa. 
The debates raised by the paradox have motivated a refinement of our views on 
emotion, providing each other with mutual feedback that has proven to be very 
generative.
We should not lose sight of this productivity when we return to the question 
with which I began this section, which considered the possibility of dismissing 
the paradox. After recognizing its instrumental value in the past, Stecker con-
siders the paradox as a ladder: »The paradox of fiction has been a valuable tool 
for exploring the nature of both imaginative and emotional responses to fiction. 
Perhaps it has now fulfilled that function. We can now kick away the ladder, 
and continue to explore these responses in their own right.« (2011, 308) Unlike 
Stecker, I think that the epistemic utility of the discussions aroused in the context 
of the paradox has not yet been exhausted. In other words, although we should 
negate the existence of paradoxes where possible, the questions prompted by this 
particular paradox and the proposals developed to solve it continue to inspire 
discussions about our engagement with fiction. However, two strategies are nec-
essary in order to make the discussions around the paradox useful for contempo-
rary research. The first involves broadening the debate to include aspects other 
than those emotions that are typically examined within the paradox, such as fear, 
pity, compassion, etc. The strong focus on these emotional responses should be 
corrected by exploring the role of moods (e.  g., melancholy, gladness), feelings 
(e.  g., vitality), or attitudes (e.  g., curiosity) in our engagement with fiction. The 
debate would also benefit from examining how our emotional responses differ 
in accordance to different types of fiction (e.  g., movies, novels, theatre, poems, 
etc.) and genres (e.  g., comic, tragic, etc.) with which we engage. And, finally, the 
paradox should take into consideration other debates, such as the debate about 
the nature of fiction and the relation between fiction and art. The second strategy 
is rather different and consists in focusing the debate on the typical emotional 
responses of fear, pity, compassion, etc. and analyzing their aesthetic, cognitive, 
and moral functions. Here I have in mind questions concerning the cognitive ben-
efits of engaging with fiction (e.  g., if our emotions towards fictions are rational, 
how does their rationality help to explain how we convey knowledge from 
fiction?), their moral implications (e.  g., if they are real emotions, how is it that 
we seem to be allowed to experience a range of emotions towards fiction, some of 
which might not be considered morally appropriate?), or their aesthetic relevance 
(e.  g., how is their rationality and authenticity related to aesthetically relevant 
values?). It does not follow from the first conclusion – namely that the paradox 
is epistemically unsustainable – that the discussions prompted by the paradox 
are also epistemically useless. A second conclusion can be extracted from this 
evaluation: The discussions raised in the context of the paradox have been and 
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remain epistemically relevant to the task of enhancing our knowledge about how 
we emotionally engage with fiction. Against this background, and following the 
second of the strategies mentioned above, the rest of my paper will concentrate 
on the necessity of emotional responses in our appreciation of fiction. This first 
requires a clarification of the relation between emotion and cognition.
3  Cognitivism for the Emotions Revisited
The previous section discussed two different periods of the paradox: a first period 
dominated by early cognitivism, according to which the emotions require belief 
or are themselves beliefs; and a second period marked by a different cognitive 
approach to the emotions whereby emotions are not always grounded in beliefs 
and their intentionality cannot be explained in terms of beliefs. This section pre-
sents a phenomenologically inspired cognitive account of the emotions with the 
aim of fleshing out their relation to cognition as well as their cognitive function.3
3.1  The Cognitive Bases of the Emotions
Emotions are about something; they are directed towards objects. These objects 
might be of different kinds: they might be physical objects, persons, animals, etc. 
but also situations and states of affairs (to refer to both I will use the term »object« 
in a broad sense). We can fear a lion and we can fear that the lion might escape 
and attack us. The objects of the emotions are presented to consciousness by cog-
nitive phenomena. But what counts as cognitive phenomena?
A view widespread in early cognitivism maintained that the only cognitive 
phenomena able to fulfill this function are beliefs. Thus, to feel shame implies the 
belief that I have done something wrong; to feel fear implies the belief that some-
thing is dangerous, etc. As already stated, this claim comes in different versions 
but all have in common the idea that in order to have an emotion we must believe 
that something is the case. This view has been subject to several objections. It has 
been argued that the view implies an »over-intellectualization« of the emotions. 
Beliefs are complex phenomena which require cognitive abilities, and if these 
abilities are a requirement for the emotions, then it is difficult to explain how 
3 In this paper I focus on the cognitive moments and functions of the emotions, but a general 
theory of the emotions should not disregard their equally essential qualitative, bodily, expres-
sive, and practical moments (cf. Vendrell Ferran 2008).
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animals, small children, etc., who do not have complex cognitive abilities, are 
able to feel emotions. It remains unclear what, if anything, may be felt without 
the capacity to judge. Moreover, in some cases the beliefs that accompany our 
emotions appear after the emotional response, so they cannot presuppose the 
emotions in either a temporal or logical sense. If I hear a loud noise and I feel 
fear, this fear is an immediate reaction to the trigger, and only afterwards can I 
judge that the loud noise implies a danger for me. Furthermore, while this view 
can explain the nature of some emotions (those based on beliefs), it cannot offer 
an explanation for emotions in which no belief is involved. Emotional responses 
such as disgust at a smell and fear of a fantasy do not involve belief. These objec-
tions make the early cognitive view unsustainable.
In order to avoid these objections, some philosophers proposed that we con-
sider phenomena other than belief as cognitive bases for the emotions. Besides 
beliefs, it has been argued that perceptions, imaginings, and memories might 
also work as cognitive bases for the emotions (cf. Greenspan 1988; Elster 1999, 
250; Mulligan 2004, 177–225; Goldie 2000, 45). In line with these views, and fol-
lowing some phenomenological suggestions, I propose to consider perceptions, 
imaginings, beliefs, and suppositions as bases for the emotions (cf. Meinong 
1969, 582). a) Perceptions might work as cognitive bases for the emotions when, 
for instance, the emotion is based on an audition (fear of the roar of a lion), 
vision (fear of the sight of a salivating dog), smell (disgust at the smell of cheese), 
tactile impression (disgust at sticky textures), or gustative impression (disgust at 
sweets). All these sensory perceptions are responsible for presenting us with the 
object of the emotions in question. b) Imaginings might also present to our con-
sciousness the objects towards which we can then react emotionally. We can be 
afraid of a fantasized image of a monster, for instance. c) Beliefs can also work as 
cognitive bases for the emotions. Anger, for instance, might be based on the belief 
that my colleague has unfairly criticized me. d) Emotions might also be based on 
suppositions.4 My anger might be based on the supposition that my colleague 
has criticized me. In this case, I do not judge that this is true or false, nor believe 
that it has happened, but simply assume that this could be the case. On the basis 
of entertaining this proposition, I can then react to it emotionally. According to 
this model, not only do cognitive phenomena other than belief work as bases for 
the emotions (and thus, the third premise of the paradox is clearly false), but the 
cases in which emotions are not based on belief are in fact much more common 
than those in which a belief is required.
4 The term »supposition« here is employed for those propositions which are entertained, 
but whose truth-value is not assessed. In this regard, it has nothing to do with the concept of 
»hypothesis«.
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The inclusion of different cognitive bases is important not only in explain-
ing everyday emotional responses, but also in explaining our emotions towards 
fiction. Some types of fiction, such as film, present us with perceptions of sounds 
and images, but do not require a belief that they exist. Imaginings are also crucial 
to explain our involvement with fiction. This is especially (although not exclu-
sively) true for novels. If I do not imagine what the novel describes, then it is 
going to be impossible to become involved in the narrative. We must also fill in 
the gaps in fiction with our imaginations: because fictions cannot present or 
describe the totality of the fictional universe, we need to imagine it. Suppositions 
are a third element to be taken seriously when considering our engagement with 
fiction. In order to engage with the fictional universe, we have to entertain the 
propositions of the narrative. These propositions – which we hold without believ-
ing – are the structure that sustains the fictional work. We entertain the proposi-
tions, we adopt them, we hold them, but we leave aside the question of their truth 
or falsity. Beliefs are also sometimes needed to respond to fiction. For instance, 
certain background beliefs are required: we have to believe that, if the narrative 
does not say otherwise, the laws of gravity are at work in the fictional universe. 
Also, beliefs about the type of fiction we are dealing with are important: my atti-
tude will be different depending on whether I am reading a science fiction book 
or a historical novel (in the latter case I will believe the historical data with which 
the author presents me and I will expect that he or she is a reliable source for 
them). These considerations show that involvement with fiction does not always 
require that we believe in fictional content. We are able to react emotionally to 
objects perceived, imagined, and supposed, and not only towards objects pre-
sented in our beliefs and which we deem to actually exist.
3.2  The Influence of Emotion on Cognition
The second claim related to the version of cognitivism endorsed in this paper con-
cerns the possibility that emotions influence cognition. Emotional experiences are 
able to mold the way in which we engage with the world cognitively. They influ-
ence our perceptions, imaginings, beliefs, and suppositions. a) Emotion can influ-
ence perception in at least three ways. It renders visible in the perceptual horizon 
features that are relevant for the subject; it attracts the subject’s attention to these 
features; and it makes the subject focus on them. Imagine that you get lost walking 
around a new city, it is getting dark, and you fear that you may not be able to arrive 
at your destination. Indeed, this fear might paralyze you completely, but it might 
also influence your perception, making some features of your environment more 
salient. I will focus on the latter possibility. Your fear might make some percep-
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tions more central than others (for instance, it makes signposts seem particularly 
relevant) while other features (such as a beautiful landscape) are perceived only 
peripherally. Once these features enter into our perceptual horizon, the fear makes 
us pay attention to them and focus on them as we attempt to gather salient infor-
mation (we will try to understand the signpost even if it is written in a language 
we do not command). b) Emotions might also influence our imaginings. Our fear 
might lead us to imagine what could happen if we remain lost, and it might also 
lead us to imagine ways of escaping the situation and putting ourselves out of 
danger. We can also imagine different actions and test them in our imagination 
in an attempt to discover which one would be most successful in achieving a safe 
outcome. c) They might also lead us to endorse, modify, and alter beliefs. My fear 
of spending the night lost in a new city might lead me to modify existing beliefs 
about myself (for instance, my belief that I possess a good sense of direction) and 
to endorse new beliefs (such as my capacity to orientate myself without any tech-
nical device). d) Finally, our suppositions might also be influenced by our emo-
tions. My fear might lead me to entertain certain thoughts about the new city, its 
environment, myself, etc. (for instance, I might suppose that the geography of the 
city makes it difficult to determine the right direction).
This influence of emotion over cognition serves practical purposes (in the 
case of fear, it allows us to identify possible dangers and put us out of harm’s 
way), but what is relevant for the argument I will develop in section 4 is that this 
influence can also be applied in the case of our emotions towards fiction. Con-
sider a situation in which we fear for the life of a protagonist. This fear guides our 
perception of the fictional situation in at least the three ways mentioned above: 
elements that can be potentially dangerous enter in our field of perception. Of 
course, this does not just happen naturally, but largely because fiction employs 
certain devices to guide our perceptions, such as particular images and narrative 
strategies. Moved by our fear and guided by the fiction itself, we attend to those 
elements which have become salient and we focus on them in order to make our 
perception more fine-grained. The fear also influences our imaginings, allowing 
us to fantasize about the destiny of the protagonist and what will happen to her 
if she does not get to safety. It will lead us to hold and to modify certain beliefs 
about the situation, the characters involved in it, their intentions, etc., and it will 
lead us to suppose certain states of affairs that constitute the fictional situation 
(my fear will lead me to suppose that certain characters might have bad inten-
tions, etc.).5
5 A further important aspect that I will not develop here concerns the possibility that our emo-
tions towards fiction influence our cognitions not only about fictions but also about reality. This 
claim is much stronger than the one endorsed here and implies that our emotional responses 
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If our emotions are able to influence the way in which we engage cognitively 
with fiction, they do not take place »off-line« without influencing the rest of our 
psychic life. What seems clear from this exposition is that these emotions are 
not »disconnected« from the rest of our self. They are based on different kinds of 
cognitions and they are able to influence, mold, and determine our cognitions in 
multiple ways. They are fully embedded in our cognitive structure.
3.3  The Cognitive Function of Emotion
The third thesis concerns the cognitive function of the emotions. As mentioned 
above, emotions are directed towards objects (persons, animals, situations, etc.). 
These objects might differ strongly depending on each individual, society, culture, 
epoch, etc. Besides these »material objects«, emotions also have »formal objects«, 
i.  e. each emotion is responsible for presenting its object to us in a certain light. 
In disgust, the object is presented as disgusting; in fear the object appears dan-
gerous, etc. (cf. Kenny 1963, 195). Unlike the material objects, the formal objects 
of the emotions are restricted: disgust might only be directed towards something 
which is presented as disgusting, and fear towards something which is presented 
as dangerous, etc. While in contemporary literature it is common to speak about 
these formal objects as evaluative or axiological properties, the phenomenologi-
cal tradition speaks of values.
The nature of such formal objects, however, is far from clear. It is also unclear 
how we might become acquainted with these objects. In recent decades, the per-
ceptual model – whose proponents include, among others, those authors men-
tioned above: Goldie, Prinz, Tappolet – has gained force. Despite differences in 
their accounts, defenders of the perceptual model argue that, in the same sense 
that perceptions present us with sensory aspects of the world, emotions give us 
direct access to its axiological properties. However, the analogy between per-
ception and emotion is imperfect. There is no one-to-one correlation between 
emotion and value. We might react to certain axiological properties with differ-
ent emotions: thus, emotions might not be responsible for presenting them. For 
instance, we can feel angry, sad, outraged, indignant or even indifferent towards 
a situation perceived as unfair. Moreover, the model cannot explain how it is pos-
sible for us to be aware of evaluative properties without experiencing emotion. 
We can »see« that a situation is dangerous without being scared ourselves. If such 
towards fiction can convey knowledge about reality. For the development of my argument, how-
ever, I do not need to prove this strong claim here.
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cases are possible, then the question remains open as to how these evaluative 
properties might be grasped (cf., for arguments against the perceptual model, 
Scheler 1973, 259; Reinach 1989, 295 sqq.; 493; Mulligan 2004, 177–225; Dokic/
Lemaire 2013, 227).
But, in my view, we do not need to struggle with all the problems associ-
ated with the perceptual model in order to defend the cognitive function of the 
emotions. For the proponents of the perceptual model, the emotions are them-
selves a kind of appraisal of a situation. However, given the counterarguments 
above, it seems more reasonable to distinguish between the appraisal and the 
emotion itself, and consider them as two different phenomena. Although logi-
cally related to one another (appraisals are a necessary condition for emotion), 
the phenomena should not be conflated. Appraisals are cognitive in the sense 
that they give us information about reality by making us acquainted with some 
of its relevant properties, but they are not necessarily a form of propositional 
knowledge. I can appraise a situation as unfair, but this form of apprehension 
is not a judgment: I see the unfairness, which is different from judging the situ-
ation to be unfair (which requires propositional thinking, reflection on particu-
lar elements, etc.). Appraisals constitute a very basic form of engagement with 
the world which is more primitive than any cognition or volition: indeed, it can 
be seen that appraisals already imbue all our perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, emotions, and actions. Following the phenomenological tradition, I will 
refer to these cognitive but non-propositional appraisals as »value-feelings« (cf. 
Scheler 1973, 259; Reinach 1989, 295; cf., for a different theory of the appraisals, 
Robinson 2013, 652).
In this phenomenological model, emotions are regarded as evaluative 
stances taken towards values (which are given to us in value-feelings). When 
we feel a value, we can react to it with an emotion. But, although the apprehen-
sion of values provokes us to respond in particular emotional fashions, these 
responses do not always take place. The apprehension of a situation as unfair 
»demands« that I react with indignation, and when this happens an emotion may 
be produced, but it is also possible that I simply appreciate that the situation is 
unfair without adopting any stance towards it. Unlike value-feelings, which are 
a primary form of involvement with the world, emotions, as already stated, are 
based on cognitions. Moreover, unlike value-feelings, emotions do not disclose 
the values they are directed towards. In what sense, then, might they fulfill a 
cognitive function?
Emotions might be considered cognitively valuable in at least in three 
respects: a) First, although they do not disclose values, they are able to gesture 
towards them. The fact that we experience an emotion is an indicator that a value 
has been felt and that we have taken a stance towards it. My indignation does 
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not instantiate the unfairness of a situation, but it does imply it. The emotion 
suggests that a certain value has been appraised (or, to put it in the language of 
sensory perception, »perceived« or »seen«, and – in the language of feeling – 
»felt«). The emotions are intentionally directed towards the appraised values, 
not because they apprehend them, but because they indicate that a value has 
been felt and a response on our part has been demanded. When this happens 
the emotion fits in the situation and is rational with regard to it. b) At the same 
time, the emotion indicates that a value is sufficiently important to us that we 
respond to it, that we care about it, and that it has relevance for our life (for 
instance, because it concerns our well-being, expectations, future plans, rela-
tions to others, etc.). When the values apprehended do not matter to us, we 
remain indifferent, but when they are significant for us, we react emotionally to 
them. In doing so, emotions not only point towards something in the world, but 
they also suggest what is important for us as individuals. Thus, it is also a sign 
of rationality that we react emotionally to that which we care about. c) There is a 
third aspect to be noted here: by considering our emotions, we might determine 
whether or not our reactions to a value are appropriate. Appropriate responses 
have sound cognitive bases (they are directed towards an object that is presented 
in a perception, imagining, etc.) and they align with the values they are directed 
towards (it would be mistaken to react with joy to something experienced as 
sad).
If this view is correct, then emotions might fulfill cognitive functions: they 
are responsible for indicating values, for showing what matters to us, and for 
being appropriate to their objects. This view applies not only to reality, but also to 
our involvement with fiction. The three cognitive dimensions are equally at work 
when we react to fictional situations. My fear for the life of the protagonist does 
not tell me that the situation is dangerous, but it indicates that I appraise the sit-
uation as such; it suggests that what happens to her matters to me, and it demon-
strates that my response is appropriate to what has been described or shown. In 
this context, our emotional responses to fiction seem as rational as our emotions 
towards reality. This model is in line with many of the observations formulated 
by the detractors of the paradox, according to which our emotional responses to 
fiction are not irrational.
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4  Appreciating Fiction
Drawing on this cognitive model, which underlines the non-paradoxical charac-
ter of our emotional responses to fiction, this section is concerned with the emo-
tions’ role in appreciation.6 Following an idea put forward by Susan Feagin (1996, 
1), I employ the concept of »appreciation« to refer to a set of abilities exercised 
with the aim of extracting value from the work. Attention will be paid to three 
activities involved in appreciation, for all of which emotion is crucial: processing 
relevant information about the fictional world, understanding aspects of it, and 
becoming acquainted with the values it presents. My aim here is to argue that 
there are particular aspects of the fictional world that can only be appreciated if 
recipients have the appropriate emotions. Some aspects of fiction in fact require 
our emotional involvement in order to be appreciated. This claim is presented 
here as a particularized one (I do not pretend to apply it to all cases of fiction): my 
aim is to argue for its validity in specific cases. Moreover, I do not claim that all 
kinds of appreciation require emotion.
Prima facie, there are two different forms of engagement with fiction. We 
can engage with fiction with or without emotion. Following a suggestion formu-
lated within the phenomenological tradition, but introducing some refinements 
to it, I will refer to these two types of aesthetic participation as »inner concen-
tration« (»Innenkonzentration«) and »outer concentration« (»Außenkonzentra-
tion«) (cf. Geiger 1974, 664). With »inner concentration«, the subject addresses 
herself towards the »inside«, focusing on the emotional experiences aroused by 
a work of art with the aim of enjoying them. With »outer concentration«, the 
subject addresses herself to the »outside« and focuses on the work, its features, 
and its values. This form of participation is »disinterested«: the subject remains 
in control of her emotions. Usually our engagement with fiction involves both 
kinds of participation; thus, these terms are in fact an abstraction and function 
as ideal types. Still, this differentiation is useful in the presentation of my argu-
ment.
There is a long tradition in aesthetics that condemns any focus on the emo-
tions in the appreciation of art and fiction, and defends the necessity of aesthetic 
appreciation without emotional influence. Many philosophers were convinced 
that emotions might interfere in the appreciation of the work and distract us from 
what is really important: its features and its values. For instance, within the field 
of phenomenology, Geiger and Ortega y Gasset thought that if we focus on what 
6 Although I use this concept in line with Feagin, the model developed here differs from hers in 
two respects. I defend a cognitive theory of the emotions inspired by phenomenology and I reject 
tout court simulationist accounts to explain how we understand others (real or fictional).
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we feel, then we are enjoying our emotions and not the work itself. According to 
them, the pleasure experienced through »inner concentration« is a pseudo-aes-
thetic pleasure because the work is used merely as a pretext to feel emotions and 
to indulge in them. Genuine aesthetic pleasure requires the »disconnection of 
the self« as a means to focus on the object as such: this is only possible through 
»outer concentration« (cf. Geiger 1974, 664; Ortega y Gasset 2006, 852). To refer to 
this negative attitude towards the emotions, I will borrow an expression coined 
by Susan Feagin (2013, 636), who refers to »the intellectualized view of appre-
ciation«. She defines this view as follows: »literary works of art are so complex 
that responding with feeling to what one reads during the process of reading risks 
taking attention away from what one ought to be attending to in the work: such 
things as the character of the writing, the structure of the plot, the subtle han-
dling of themes, the vividness and intricacy of its detail« (ibid.). To put this suc-
cinctly: the intellectualized view claims that true appreciation must be devoid of 
emotion.7
Against this widespread view, in what follows I will argue that some aspects 
of the fiction can only be appreciated through »inner concentration«, i.  e. with the 
help of our emotions. The cognitive approach developed in the previous section 
can explain how the emotions might in fact play a significant role in the appreci-
ation of art and fiction. Let’s consider three capacities for appreciating fiction, all 
of which involve emotion.8
a) The emotions we experience while engaging with fiction contribute to our 
processing of information and our obtaining knowledge about the fictional 
world. As mentioned in section 3, emotions are responsible for presenting 
certain elements in our perceptual horizon and they lead us to pay attention 
to these elements in order to obtain as much information as possible. The 
features I have in mind are not the printed sentences of a novel, or the texture 
of the paper or screen, but elements of the narrative that concern the plot and 
its meanings (such as what happens to the fictional characters, the affective 
significance of the fictional situation, etc.). Emotions are linked to patterns of 
attention, so that once we feel fear (or disgust, or pity, etc.), our engagement 
with the world will attend to those moments that are relevant from the point 
of view of a person affected by the emotion in question. Thus, fear for the pro-
7 Feagin mentions Peter Kivy as a contemporary proponent of this view and she is interested in 
offering an alternative to the intellectualized view.
8 The claim that appreciation implies emotion is not to be conflated with the claim that appre-
ciation is an emotional state. The emotions are necessary but not sufficient for the appreciation 
of fiction, since this phenomenon might involve different processes which are not emotions (cf., 
for objections against the view that appreciation is itself an emotion, Robinson 2013, 669 sq.).
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tagonist will lead me to notice, attend to and focus on those objects, persons, 
situations, etc. described or depicted in the fiction as dangerous, in order that 
I might obtain information about them, witness their effects on the protago-
nist, and consider which resources she might have to escape the danger, etc. 
They might also influence our imaginings so that we are able to have a full 
picture of the fictional universe: in becoming imaginatively involved, we can 
imagine scenes which still constitute part of the fiction, even if they are not 
described or depicted. Emotional appreciation allows us to hold suppositions 
that help us to enter into the fictional world of the work: we construct the fic-
tional world supposing that, in the fiction in question, particular things are 
indeed the way they are.
b) Emotions towards fiction might also play a crucial role in understanding 
fiction. Certainly, we can understand some fictional works without consider-
ing our emotional response: for instance, by focusing on the causal connec-
tions between events. However, some works and/or some aspects of the work 
require an emotional involvement in order to be fully understood.9 In some 
cases, an affective participation in the lives of the characters is required: it is 
only by putting ourselves in their shoes that we can gain an internal perspec-
tive on their situations and understand their actions, thoughts, feelings, and 
attitudes. If we are unable to achieve this shift of perspective, then we cannot 
fully understand how the world is for the character. Why is this? A »cold« 
participation in the life of a character, for instance, via a theory of the mind 
that helps us to explain that character’s behavior, attitudes, feelings, and 
thoughts, is not the most natural and common way to engage with fictional 
others. In fact, it can result in extenuating theories about the characters and 
why they act, think, perceive, and feel the way they do. Our understanding of 
others might occasionally require some kind of theorizing, but under normal 
conditions this would take place spontaneously. A more powerful explana-
tion is that understanding characters requires us to imagine »what it is like« 
to be in a certain situation, to undergo a certain experience, to be a person 
different from the one we are, etc. If we put ourselves in the place of another 
person and we want to be realistic about it, we usually do not have to develop 
a theory about that person, but we do have to get as close as possible to her 
experiences. Since emotions are those mental phenomena whose qualitative 
aspects are most relevant to us, it makes sense to interpret this experiential 
9 Contemporary accounts are divided in respect of the role of emotion in understanding narra-
tive. For some authors, it is necessary to understand the causal connections in order to under-
stand a narration, while for others, narrations can only be understood in terms of their emotional 
patterns.
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moment as an emotionally charged one. Thus, we need to somehow try to 
imagine what things are like for the other using the matrix of what we already 
know from our experiences.10
 The last claim requires further clarification: If a theory is not enough, should 
we then simulate the character’s mental states? Certainly imagining and 
imagining emotions of the other is required here, but the use of the imagina-
tion cannot be reduced to simulation.11 In order to understand the character, 
we must take as a point of departure what we already know about our emo-
tions, modifying this information in order to adapt the imagined emotions 
to the fictional situation. Only when we are able to imagine how things are 
for the character, and adopt her perspective on the situation in which she is 
involved, can we fully understand her and her actions, feelings, thoughts, 
etc. The term »imagination« here means something distinct from the term 
»simulation«. The latter term implies that we recreate a similar state within 
ourselves, i.  e. that we remain centered in ourselves and we imagine how it 
would feel for us to be in that situation (cf. Feagin 1996; Currie/Ravenscroft 
2002). Moreover, some simulationists claim that the emotions we experience 
are experienced as disconnected from the rest of our psychic life. On the 
contrary, my use of the term »imagination« does not imply that we put our-
selves in the place of the other by imagining how it would be for us (self-cen-
tered perspective-shifting), but rather by imagining how it is for the other 
(other-centered perspective-shifting). Second, I consider that the emotional 
responses we experience while engaging with fiction are as real as our emo-
tions towards reality. They are not disconnected from the rest of our psychic 
life, but are embedded in it, and they mirror our beliefs, our expectations 
and our order of preferences. Thus, to feel saddened by a fictional situa-
tion in which someone gets hurt reveals that in fiction as in real life I care 
about bodily integrity and that this is an important value for me. Notice that 
in the model proposed here, we do not have to feel exactly what the char-
acter depicted is supposed to feel; rather we experience an emotion of the 
same type, i.  e. an emotion whose Gestalt belongs to the same family as the 
10 This focus on empathic understanding should not lose sight of other forms of understanding 
which also require emotional involvement. I am thinking here about certain forms of non-propo-
sitional moral knowledge. For instance, one might rightly judge lying as a morally wrong action, 
but come to see how under certain circumstances lying is morally acceptable. For this, it is nec-
essary that the subject gets emotionally involved in the situation, that she is embedded in it and 
it becomes an internal perspective.
11 I do not rely on the imagination to explain all cases of understanding the fictional other, 
since there are cases in which the expression of the other (for instance, in a movie) might give me 
direct access to her emotional state.
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emotion hypothetically experienced by the fictional character (we could use 
as a determinant for this Gestalt the following Wundtian features: pleasure, 
pain, excitement, depression, tension, relief, etc.).
c) A further feature of the emotions, which makes them important for appre-
ciation, concerns their capacity to make us acquainted with values. They 
refer to values, alert us to what we care about, and allow us to consider if 
our responses are appropriate. By engaging with fiction and responding to it 
emotionally we become aware of the particular values that it presents. Thus, 
in experiencing fear for the protagonist, I become aware that the fiction pre-
sents me with something dangerous, that I care about what happens to the 
protagonist, and this response might seem appropriate to me. We apprehend 
evaluative properties presented by the work by becoming aware that the work 
might elicit certain emotional responses in us. Attention to these emotional 
reactions might also give us information about the values of the work, allow-
ing us to categorize it as deep, banal, funny, beautiful, enjoyable, etc. Emo-
tions also work as indicators of what is relevant for us. When we react emo-
tionally to a work of fiction, this shows not only that the work has a certain 
value per se, but also that this value matters enough for us to take a stance 
towards it.
From these reflections it is clear that emotions might be required for the appre-
ciation of some works and/or some aspects of a work. However, I should also be 
fair to some of the suspicions against the emotions voiced by proponents of the 
»intellectualized model of appreciation«. There is something valid in the view 
that emotions might play a negative role in appreciation. Emotions experienced 
during the process of appreciation might indeed distract us from the work. More-
over, if our engagement with a work is simply a search for novel and intense emo-
tions in which we might indulge, this does not suggest a genuine interest in that 
work. It is also true that we can appreciate a work without emotion, for instance, 
by applying rules learned about specific genres or styles, or by recognizing in it 
features that are considered valuable. This is correct, but if the cognitive model of 
the emotions proposed in this paper is sound, it is also true that there are some 
works and/or some aspects of a work that can only be appreciated by having 
emotions and by focusing on them. Through »inner concentration« we appre-
ciate aspects of the work which can only be given to us by having emotions and 
attending to them (salient features, the inner perspective of the characters, the 
evaluative meanings of the work, etc.). Thus, I do not advocate for substituting 
the »intellectualized view« for an »emotionalized« one; instead I propose that 
we allow the emotions a functional role in our appreciation of a work. In fact, I 
think that often both kinds of appreciation – namely through »inner concentra-
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tion« and through »outer concentration« – are intertwined and complement one 
another.
Becoming acquainted with the fictional world, understanding it, becoming 
aware of the values that it presents and the emotional reactions it elicits in us, all 
contribute to our appreciation of the work. This list of activities is not, in itself, 
completely sufficient, nor is it absolutely necessary for appreciation (because, as 
I have said, an appreciation without emotion is also possible), but it is illustrative 
of the importance that our emotional responses to fiction have for finding value 
in the work. Thus, our emotional responses to fiction are not only rational and 
real: sometimes they are also crucial for appreciating it.
5  Concluding Remarks
Although the question of why and how we are able to engage with fiction is a 
theme that has provoked perennial fascination from philosophers, the ques-
tion does not entail a paradox. The paradox of fiction was motivated by a view 
of the emotions typical of early cognitivism, which, in my view, can no longer 
be endorsed by scholars. That said, we can dismiss the paradox as superfluous 
while preserving the value of the rich discussions it provoked. Given how genera-
tive the paradox has proven to be, these discussions have maintained their valid-
ity and can be used as an epistemic tool for shedding light on some key aspects 
of our engagements with fiction. In this paper, I have tried to illustrate how our 
emotional responses towards fiction contribute to our appreciation of it.
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